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Realizing a Promise: A Case for Ratification of the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
by Jan Kratochvíl*

T

I. Introduction

he sixtieth anniversary of the
of

Human Rights (UDHR)

Universal Declaration

will be remembered as an

international breakthrough for the protection of

(social rights). This category of rights has been given second-class status and treated
with mistrust and caution. Their adjudication was considered
impossible and undesirable. Yet on December 10, 2008, the UN
General Assembly unanimously adopted an Optional Protocol
(Protocol) to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Covenant) that enables victims of violations of rights covered by the Covenant to file individual complaints to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Committee). Its adoption marks a watershed in the quest
for realizing the UDHR’s promise expressed by the UN motto,
“All human rights for all.”
Adoption of the Protocol resonated positively within the
global human rights community. Thirty-six UN human rights
Special Rapporteurs welcomed the Protocol’s adoption as “an
essential step” in reinforcing “the universality, indivisibility,
interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights, and
the guarantee of dignity and justice for all.”1 Similarly, the
International NGO Coalition for an Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
described it as “an historic advance for human rights.”2 The
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay,
described the adoption as having “singular importance by closing a historic gap.”3
Not all, however, are excited about the Protocol. Most notably and importantly, the reaction of states was mixed. Although
some states expressed their intention to become parties to the
Protocol, others voiced serious skepticism regarding the rationale of adjudicating social rights and therefore the existence of
the Protocol itself. This essay briefly describes the main features
of the Protocol before specifying the concerns held by some
states regarding the Protocol. Finally, the essay attempts to dispel the concerns and present arguments for why states should
ratify the Protocol.

Courtesy of David Marques.

economic, social and cultural rights

Residents from Chicago's Southside speak out to save their homes from
foreclosure.

fered violations of their rights to file a complaint before an international body. Its main features are similar to the corresponding
mechanisms under other UN human rights treaties. The Protocol
spells out admissibility criteria for accepting communications
and contains procedural rules for the Committee to deal with
them. Similar to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention
against Torture, the Protocol creates an optional inquiry procedure if the Committee “receives reliable information indicating
grave or systematic violations by a State Party of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant.” As in
the newer mechanisms (i.e. optional protocols to CEDAW and
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) the
Protocol contains an explicit acknowledgement of the power of
the Committee to issue interim measures. An innovative feature
of this Protocol, however, is the express inclusion of a follow-up
procedure under which states are obliged to respond within six
months to the recommendations of the Committee.

Admissibility Criteria
The inclusion of particular admissibility criteria was among
the more contentious issues during the negotiations and an area
where some compromises had to be made. Besides the standard
admissibility criteria like exhaustion of domestic remedies,
compatibility ratione materiae and temporis, etc., there are two
new criteria. First, a communication must not be “exclusively
based on reports disseminated by mass media.”5 This provision
was included in order to exclude communications dependent
only on second-hand information and thus only indirectly related
to the alleged victim or petitioner. Crucial, however, is the addition of a new criterion in international law. Under Article 4 of the

II. The Content of the Protocol
Even though a new treaty, others have already analyzed the
Protocol elsewhere.4 An overview of its main features, however,
is appropriate. The Protocol is in many ways a standard instrument establishing the right of individuals claiming to have suf-
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Protocol, the Committee can declare a communication inadmissible if it “does not reveal that the author has suffered a clear disadvantage.” This provision mirrors a similar condition included
in Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights
which is not yet in force, by which European countries have tried
to address the vast volume of complaints in Strasbourg. A similar rationale was behind the addition of the criterion here. It is
meant to give a tool to the Committee with which it can protect
itself from being flooded by communications.
The inclusion of Article 4 was far from uncontroversial.
Some viewed it as limiting the access of victims of violations to
the procedure and signaling that some violations of the Covenant
do not matter. One must keep in mind, however, that it is only a
procedural criterion. It does not follow that states do not need to
remedy “minor” violations of the Covenant. It is only a way for
the Committee to manage its workload and concentrate on the
most important cases should the need arise. In that sense, given
that the Committee “may” apply this admissibility criterion
“if necessary,”6 it should not be used unless the Committee is
overwhelmed with cases to the point that it makes both effective
examination of communications and its other work impossible.

Overall, it is fair to say that the Protocol is a major success
in terms of its coherence and integrity. It does not compromise
or undermine any of the rights in the Covenant or any aspects of
the rights. On the contrary, it establishes the first comprehensive
and universal procedure for individual complaints regarding
violations of all aspects of social rights. Yet adoption of the
instrument by the General Assembly is only a preliminary step.
Its acceptance and ratification by as many states as possible is
equally if not more important. The article next identifies and
responds to some concerns states had with the Protocol and
subsequently presents arguments for its ratification.

III. Objections to the Protocol
While many governments welcomed the adoption of the
Protocol, several countries expressed skepticism about the
individual adjudication of social rights. Their comments centered on the alleged difficulty in adjudicating these complaints.
Specifically, governments who spoke against the Protocol were
concerned with the vagueness of the Covenant, the progressive
nature of the obligations and the illegitimate transgression into
states’ (mainly budgetary) policies.
It is telling, though, that in the public record no delegation
defended an absolutist view that social rights are not justiciable.
Rather, they put forward specific arguments concerning why the
Covenant is not easily subject to adjudication. Hopefully, this
signals that the debate on justiciability has become largely obsolete. The shift is understandable given mounting evidence and
examples of cases and decisions on social rights. Commenting
on a recent publication that compiled social rights cases from
various jurisdictions, Philip Alston, one of the early proponents
of the Protocol in the beginning of 1990s, said, “This book provides eloquent testimony to the fact that the debate about the
justiciability of social rights has come of age.”9
The point that social rights are not conceptually different from civil and political rights and therefore susceptible to
adjudication in the same way has been argued extensively and
persuasively elsewhere.10 Consequently, this essay focuses only
on specific arguments governments raised.
First, the premise that civil rights, compared with social rights,
are defined precisely is indefensible. For example by reading the
succinctly written Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (“No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”) it is not immediately obvious that a violation will occur
when states do not effectively investigate alleged acts of torture.
Moreover, it is not obvious that states must provide necessary
medical treatment to detainees; nor is it clear from the language
of Article 7 which acts constitute torture. Yet, the Human Rights
Committee found in its case-law all these obligations to arise
from Article 7. To find all obligations generated by a right and
to clarify any ambiguities, practitioners must look to the case
law and not simply the text of an article. Even if the rights in the
Covenant look imprecise, it does not hinder their adjudication
any more than civil rights. After all, interpreting and making
obligations concrete by relating them to real life situations and
questions is the essence of judicial work.11
Second, social rights in the Covenant are defined as “progressive.” Under the Covenant, a state party “undertakes to take
steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recog-

The Issue of Collective Rights
A last minute compromise was achieved at the Human
Rights Council regarding the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Committee, an issue that threatened the whole Protocol. The
controversy was and still is whether the Committee should be
able to review communications alleging violations of the right
to self-determination. Ultimately the issue was not resolved and
was left for the Committee to decide. During the adoption in
the General Assembly, many states cautioned against such an
approach, opining that the Committee should adopt the same
interpretation as the Human Rights Committee, which maintains
that individuals do not have standing to claim that a state has
violated the right to self-determination because it is a collective
right.7 As the Human Rights Committee can receive only individual communications, it effectively cannot consider alleged
violations of the right to self-determination. A similar interpretation may be warranted here as the Protocol also does not allow
collective complaints.
Yet, interpreting the Protocol in such a way that would limit
standing to individuals and groups of individuals may pose a
problem vis-à-vis other collective rights in the Covenant, namely
the rights of trade unions under Article 8. Some suggest that the
Committee may consider trade unions a group of individuals.8 If
that is accepted by the Committee then it can be argued analogically that “people” enjoying the right to self-determination are
nothing more than a group of individuals. From this perspective
the questions whether the Committee can consider communications alleging violation of trade unions rights and the right to
self-determination are closely connected.
Another thorny issue in the negotiations was how the
Protocol would deal with the obligation of international cooperation towards realizing the rights in the Covenant. Ultimately,
the Committee will be only allowed to send recommendations
regarding need for technical assistance to specialized UN agencies, funds and programs and other competent bodies. A novel
provision, however, envisions creation of a voluntary trust fund,
which would finance programs of building national capacities
regarding technical expertise relevant for social rights.
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[T]he Protocol is a major success in terms of its
coherence and integrity. It does not compromise or
undermine any of the rights in the Covenant or any
aspects of the rights. On the contrary, it establishes
the first comprehensive and universal procedure for
individual complaints regarding violations of all aspects
of [economic,] social, [and cultural] rights.
nized in the present Covenant.”12 In contrast, under the ICCPR,
states simply undertake to “respect and to ensure” the rights.13
But even that does not make them conceptually different to the
extent that they would be unjusticiable. First, not all obligations from the Covenant are progressive in nature. An example
is the prohibition of discrimination.14 But that is arguably not
important, given that the Protocol envisions adjudication of all
obligations under the Covenant. Yet progressive obligations do
not mean that they should be fulfilled sometime in the future.
It is an immediate obligation to take “deliberate, concrete and
targeted” steps towards achieving full realization of the rights in
the Covenant.15 As such, it becomes a matter of evaluating the
steps taken by the government.
Human rights obligations can be divided into two categories:
obligations of result and obligations of due diligence. The former
requires reaching concrete results; for example, the absence of
acts of torture. If the result is not achieved, a violation occurs. The
latter concentrates not on results, but on the process or procedure.
For example, states must effectively investigate all alleged acts
of torture. Such investigations must fulfill certain criteria, but a
violation does not always occur when a perpetrator is not found or
punished. These latter obligations might be seen as more vague;
but they are only more complex. There is no single fact which,
if proved, results in a violation. Deliberation of the adjudicator
involves testing the conduct against multiple criteria. This kind
of deliberation is far from impossible; human rights bodies have
engaged in these tests for years while adjudicating civil and political rights. It is therefore not the case that adjudicating progressive
obligations, which are obligations of due diligence, is impossible,
or per se illegitimately transgresses state policies.
Similarly, civil rights also have extensive budgetary implications. Therefore, it is simply not possible to say that decisions
with budgetary implications are illegitimate as a matter of course.
The underlying concern is a fear that an overzealous Committee
will dictate state policies. Critics say that the Committee should
not tell states how much to spend on healthcare, housing, nor
education, etc. The crux of the dispute, therefore, is not justiciability of social rights itself but the methods of (quasi-)judicial
review. The Protocol accommodates these concerns well.
One of the crucial issues in the negotiation of the Protocol
was to agree on a test the Committee should adopt in reviewing

the positive obligation of states. This is indeed the current topical issue in the justiciability debate. Article 8(4) of the Protocol
stipulates that “the Committee shall consider the reasonableness
of the steps taken . . . In doing so, the Committee shall bear in
mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy
measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the
Covenant.” This language ensures that the Committee does not
illegitimately transgress into the field of policy decisions.
In fact, the current practice of the Committee shows that
it is working exactly along these lines. It has made clear that
states exercise a margin of discretion in devising their policies
implementing the Covenant.16 The need for such discretion is
acknowledged in the expert opinions17 and literature advocating
social rights protection.18 Consequently, there is no basis to fear
that the Committee will engage in overzealous and illegitimate
review practices. Providing states with considerable discretion
implies that even if the Committee might think that there are
better ways to secure social rights, it does not follow that there
is a violation of the Covenant. A violation will happen only if the
measures taken by the state fail the test of reasonableness.
The standard of reasonableness is famously used in adjudicating progressive obligations under the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa.19 The test is also well known in adjudicating civil and political rights. The European Court of Human
Rights uses reasonableness in deciding if the measure a state
adopted in fulfilling its obligation to protect is satisfactory.20
More generally, the concept of reasonableness is widely used
in common-law systems. The test captures the idea that most
rights, including all social rights, are not absolute. For example,
not everyone has a right to be provided with a house. Rather
states must take reasonable steps to ensure that everyone has
access to adequate housing. If somebody does not have access,
a violation is still not inevitable because the steps taken might
still be reasonable. Applying the test to particular cases, the
Committee can be further guided by the abundant experience of
other bodies in other contexts.
The Committee has already articulated its preliminary
thoughts on how it would determine whether adopted measures are reasonable. It emphasizes the procedural criterion of
“transparent and participative decision-making processes.”21
Substantively, it pointed, inter alia, to requirements that the
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exercise of discretion is non-discriminatory, that the measures
are deliberate, concrete and targeted, and take into account
“disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups.”22
These criteria hardly evoke an overzealous second-judgment of
government policies.
Moreover, the fears of illegitimate transgression into states’
policies are considerably lowered by nature of the Committee’s
mandate. All the Committee can issue are recommendations.
So there is no well-founded fear that the Committee would substitute state’s decisions by its own judgments. The State party
would still have the option of adopting its own alternative measures, as the Committee itself acknowledges.23 Consequently,
the fear that the Committee will dictate states’ budgets and the
general issue of appropriate remedies for violations of social
rights is moot.
Even though the concerns of states vis-à-vis the Protocol are
unfounded, a question still remains why states should ratify the
Protocol. The next and last section will present several arguments for ratification.

at home, rather than facing the prospect of a negative outcome of
an international procedure. Governments generally try to avoid
condemnations at the international level.26 This will inevitably
encourage states to pay greater attention to social rights and
provide effective remedies at home. Consequently, victims’ right
to an effective remedy will be strengthened.
Current neglect of social rights at the international level
results in many governments logically paying more attention
and devoting more resources to protecting civil rights than social
rights. This is an arbitrary distinction between civil and social
rights that hurts those suffering from or susceptible to social
destitution. Similarly, even though protection of all human rights
is important, when states allow individual petitions for civil
rights violations and not social rights violations, they implicitly
privilege one group (victims of civil rights violations) against
others (victims of social rights violations). The Protocol ends
this schism and presents an opportunity to intensify social rights
protection domestically.
It will be wise for governments to internalize social rights
into policy and decision-making processes. Government must
consider consequences for social rights of all their actions and
devise concrete plans for furthering the realization of social
rights. This will be the best for ensuring that they comply with
obligations under the Covenant. In this way, the Protocol may
lead governments to mainstream social rights into all their activities. Mainstreaming social rights is needed to prevent violations
in the first place. Thus, the Protocol will strengthen domestic
implementation of the Covenant.
This also implies that allowing individual adjudication of
social rights is not an expensive way to achieve justice for individuals. On the contrary, at most times the decision will have
a systemic effect. Besides providing a possible remedy for the
actual petitioner, states will have a chance to adjust their practices which will often positively affect a much wider population.
Examples of this systemic effect from national jurisdictions
are distribution of food to all those suffering from hunger,27
nationwide distribution of AIDS treatment drugs,28 or extending
the right to social security to all non-nationals with permanent
residence.29

IV. Reasons to Ratify
There are myriad reasons why individuals should have
access to international remedies when alleging human rights
violations. The main reason is that there should be independent
oversight of states’ human rights obligations. With the wide
range of international mechanisms allowing individuals to
petition civil rights violations, the principle is hardly disputed.
Bearing in mind that all arguments for individual access apply
in the same way to social rights, the question is whether there
are particular reasons for establishing individual petitions for
victims of social rights violations.

Moving Social Rights into the Spotlight
The Protocol is the first universal mechanism for adjudicating social rights. Several reasons why states should ratify the
Protocol arise from that fact alone. As mentioned, the Protocol
brings an end to sixty years of neglect of social rights exemplified also by a lack of effective overview mechanisms. Social
rights have been marginalized in the discourse both at an international level and in the vast majority of states. The Protocol
transforms the theory that the protection of all human rights
requires the same emphasis24 into practice. It highlights social
rights, which is a necessary precondition for improving their
overall enjoyment. There are two principal ways the Protocol
can achieve this objective.
First, individual applications telling individual stories will
make social rights more attractive for a public audience. Social
rights will acquire a human face. Such stories are able to gain
public awareness in a way that concluding recommendations on
periodic reports can never do. The media is more likely to report
the story of a person living in slums than to report that a committee “is concerned about the lack of a national housing policy
which . . . addresses the needs of . . . those living in slums.”25
This will generate higher awareness of social rights among a
larger population and foster local movements for protection of
social rights. The media and the general public’s focus on these
rights is likely to generate greater government interest and consequently better protection of these rights.
Second, a possibility of an international quasi-judicial review
provides governments with high incentives to resolve problems

Adjudication as a Benefit for Good Faith States
The procedure established by the Protocol cannot, however,
be seen as a whip under which states will labor to improve social
rights. On the contrary, the rationale of the procedure is to help
states fulfill their obligations under the Covenant by considering
individual cases and decisions based on real-life situations. The
decisions will provide guidance in situations that states face in
practice. The views of the Committee will highlight issues that
the state possibly overlooked or misinterpreted. Any state that
is serious about good faith fulfillment of international obligations will welcome the mechanism as a source of insight into its
duties. By ratification, a state will take the moral high ground
and be seen as treating its international obligations under the
Covenant seriously.
Moreover, individual adjudication of social rights will
help identify and suggest solutions for actual problems on the
ground. Individuals themselves know best what troubles them.
Petitions brought by individuals will thus be a valuable source
of information where problems are perceived.30 This will be an
33

indication both for the governments and international community of what kind of issues to address.

invites politicians, who are trying to win minds of the majority,
to further socially exclude them. A classic example is the treatment of the Roma minority in many European countries. Social
rights and their judicial protection provide important empowerment and voice to legitimate claims. As the Committee put it, the
non-justiciability of social rights “would also drastically curtail
the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.”35
Sandra Fredman elaborated this point, arguing that judicial
protection of social rights strengthens democracy. The courts
can hold those in power accountable and they can assure that a
decision by an executive was done in a deliberative fashion with
proper reasons.36 By giving voice to minorities, adjudication
remedies the majoritarian bias of democracy.
The arguments presented above are valid reasons why
states should ratify the Protocol. Some states, however, may
be concerned for some reasons with social rights protection
in other states. For example, some might be concerned about
the plight of humans anywhere on the planet but others might
be concerned with social rights abroad because they do not
want people migrating to their country to enjoy greater social
rights protection. Whatever reason a state has in supporting
social rights abroad, it is hardly possible for it to propose that
other states ratify the Protocol without itself first being a party.
Therefore, this serves as another reason for a state to become a
party to the Protocol.
Finally, some governments, including Japan, are not categorically against ratifying the Protocol. Instead, they want to
see how the mechanism will work before committing to it. Yet
if every state waited for others to make the first move, no state
would ratify the Protocol. More importantly, there are additional
advantages to becoming a party soon. Ratification will present
the state as sympathetic to social rights and as wishing to live
up to the standards set sixty years ago by the UDHR. The first
ratifying states will also have the biggest influence on how the
procedure will develop in practice. They will be able to frame
the procedures and standards of review for all the subsequently
ratifying states. Finally, states retain the authority to denounce
the Protocol if they are unhappy with the Committee’s interpretations of its powers or of the Covenant’s provisions.

Solving the Alleged Vagueness of Social Rights and
Cultivating Compliance
The Protocol will address the issue that some states have
against the adjudication of social rights, namely their vagueness.
This argument for perceived unjusticiability of social rights can
be actually reversed. Perhaps social rights are vague because they
are not adjudicated. The Protocol will break this vicious circle
and contribute to better understanding social rights’ content and
the obligations arising from them. Even though the Committee
has done a considerable amount of work to this end, especially in
its general comments, there is only so much that it can achieve.
As Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem state, “there are limits to
how well any supervisory body, no matter how democratic, diligent, or expert, can determine whether policies and laws respect
human rights without having the benefit of real-life detail that
individual petitions provide.”31
At the same time, states do not need to fear that any binding decisions will be imposed on them. The Committee has the
power to issue only non-binding recommendations. The rationale
of the Protocol is not enforcement, but rather more subtle kinds
of implementation like highlighting, mainstreaming and assisting the governments to identify with more precision their obligations under the Covenant. Contrary to what Michael Dennis
and David Stewart in their article claim, the Protocol is exactly
that kind of soft enforcement of international law via “norminternalization,” and cultivation of “voluntary obedience” that
they favor as opposed to compelling compliance.32 Furthermore,
as Thomas Franck argued, the indeterminacy of norms is a cause
for lower levels of compliance.33 Thus the concretizations of the
obligations will further induce better levels of voluntary state
compliance with obligations under the Covenant.

Ending the Marginalization of Victims
States should ratify the Protocol because it will allow individuals to publicly tell their stories at an international level. The
benefits human rights victims derive when judicial bodies listen
to their stories are studied within the context of international
criminal justice. The benefits include relieving victims’ sense of
societal abandonment, the psychological benefits of testifying or
publicly telling their story and victims’ sense of empowerment.34
There is no reason to believe that these positive effects will not
apply in cases of social rights violations. Adjudication transforms experienced neglect into a situation where problems matter and brings the individuals hope. In many cases, it might well
be a false hope when no improvement materializes, or at least
not in the short-term. But it is submitted that when an independent expert body reviews the case, a different level of respecting
the inherent dignity of every individual is achieved.
Another important reason states should ratify the Protocol
lies in the nature of rights as tools of empowerment. The poor
protection of social rights most seriously affects people living on
the margins of society. These people are often disadvantaged in
many ways and effectively unable to claim their rights through
usual democratic processes. Their political power is insignificant. If anything, their unpopularity among majority populations

Conclusion
This short essay has argued that states have nothing to fear
from ratifying the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. It is a great opportunity
for states to focus on complying with their obligations under the
Covenant and to seriously address the social rights of their population. The Protocol has the potential to improve social rights
protection. Of course, this is not to suggest that social rights adjudication is a panacea that will solve all problems in the world. It
is only one part, though very important, of a broader mosaic of
effective human rights protection. Overall, the Protocol can help
to realize the promise of the UDHR of an “advent of a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want.”37 It is now up to the states
whether they will live up to the promise and ratify the Protocol
or let it slowly decay into disuse and thus neglect the fundamental needs of millions of people.		
HRB
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